

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 November 1951

SUBJECT: NIE-36/1: PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF A NON-
COMMUNIST REGIME IN BURMA

THE PROBLEM

To review the conclusions of NIE-36, "Prospects for Survival of a Non-Communist Regime in Burma" dated 1 August 1951, with reference to the timing of possible control over part or all of Burma by the Burmese Communists.

ESTIMATE

1. In NIE-36 it was estimated that the Communists "will probably be able within the next year or two to achieve de facto control over a considerable area of northern Burma" and that if covert Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists continues "the Burmese Government is not likely to survive in the long run unless it greatly increases its political and military strength."

~~SECRET~~

2. Recent reports indicate that both the political and military situation may be deteriorating more rapidly than had been estimated in NIE-36. As anticipated the Chinese Communists have continued their support of the Burmese Communists. In addition there is evidence that the Burmese Communists are making progress toward collaboration with the Karens thus increasing the over-all capabilities of the insurgents. Furthermore, the Thakin Nu Government is becoming even more unstable than indicated in NIE-36. The pro-Communist Burma Workers and Peoples Party has become increasingly effective in unifying left-wing opposition to the Burmese Government and in hampering the government's operation against the insurgents. The left-wing Socialist leader, Ba Swe, may exercise his increasing influence to replace Thakin Nu with a pro-Communist Prime Minister.

3. We therefore conclude that the Burmese Communists may achieve control of large areas of northern Burma within the next six to eight months and that there is a possibility that the Burmese Government may be replaced by a pro-Communist regime within the next few months.

~~SECRET~~